Abstract. This paper introduces two new ideas in the construction of fast universal hash functions geared towards the task of message authentication. First, we describe a simple but novel family of universal hash functions that is more e cient than many standard constructions. We compare our hash functions to the MMH family studied by Halevi and Krawczyk 13]. All the main techniques used to optimize MMH work on our hash functions as well. Second, we introduce additional techniques for speeding up our constructions; these techniques apply to MMH and may apply to other hash functions. The techniques involve ignoring certain parts of the computation, while still retaining the necessary statistical properties for secure message authentication. Finally, we give implementation results on an ARM processor. Our constructions are general and can be used in any setting where universal hash functions are needed; therefore they may be of independent interest.
Introduction
Message Authentication. Designing good Message Authentication schemes is a very important objective in cryptography. The goal in message authentication is for one party to e ciently transmit a message to another party in such a way that the receiving party can determine whether or not the message he receives has been tampered with. The setting involves two parties, Alice and MAC, = S x (M). She sends (M; ) to Bob, and upon receiving the pair, Bob computes V x (M; ) which returns 1 if the MAC is valid, or returns 0 otherwise. Without knowledge of the secret key x, it should be infeasible for an adversary to construct a message and a corresponding MAC that the veri cation algorithm will accept as valid. The formal security requirement for a MAC was rst de ned by Bellare, et al 4] . This de nition is analogous to the formal security de nition of a digital signature 12] . In particular, we say that an adversary forges a MAC if, when given oracle access to (S x ; V x ), where x is kept secret, the adversary can come up with a pair (M ; ) such that V x (M ; ) = 1 but the message M was never made an input to the oracle for S x .
Importance of Efficient MACs. In general, MACs are computed frequently and on inputs which are often thousands of bytes long. Moreover, computing and verifying tags is typically done in software, and may be done on relatively weak platforms. Additionally, the computations must be done in real time. Therefore, developing techniques for optimizing MAC Algorithms while retaining the appropriate level of security is crucial. This paper presents two novel ideas in this direction.
Common Approaches to Message Authentication. One approach to message authentication involves using a secure block cipher, such as DES 22] , in cipher block chaining mode. Another approach to message authentication, often seen in practice, involves using cryptographic hash functions like MD5 26] . For example, one approach was to set = MD5(x m x); unfortunately, this particular scheme is vulnerable to a clever key recovery attack due to Preneel and and van Oorschot 25] . Other work on using cryptographic hash functions in MACs is the HMAC construction of Bellare, et al 3] ; their schemes are good because they use fast and secure cryptographic building blocks. At rst it appears that these techniques yield the most e cient results; however, Wegman and Carter 30 ] discovered that universal hash functions, allow us to avoid using heavy duty cryptographic primitives on the entire input string.
The Universal Hash Function Approach. In this approach, one starts with a family of hash functions H where for any pair m 6 = m 0 and for any element in the range, Pr h h(m) ? h(m 0 ) = ] : Here is a parameter related to the security of the MAC). Such functions are called --universal hash functions. Now, in order to compute the authentication tag for a message m, the communicating parties secretly agree on a function h 2 H chosen at random, and on a sequence of random pads p 1 ; p 2 : : :. To compute a MAC on the i-th message m i , the sender computes i = h(m i ) + p i . One remarkable aspect of this approach is that, even if a computationally unbounded adversary performs q black-box oracle queries to both algorithms used by the MAC, he has probability less than q to forge the MAC. The idea in the Wegman-Carter construction is to pre-process a message quickly using universal hash functions, and then apply a cryptographic operation such as a one-time pad. In general, the one-time pad can be replaced by pseudo-random sequence. Then, the parties would have to pre-agree on the function h and on the seed s which would be fed to either a pseudo-random generator or a pseudo-random function 11]. This approach to message authentication was rst studied in 7] . If pseudo-randomness is used, then the resulting MAC is secure against a polynomially bounded adversary. The Square Hash. This paper introduces two new ideas in the construction of fast universal hash functions. We start with a simple but novel family of universal hash functions which should be more e cient than certain well-known hash function families. The e ciency lies in the fact that whereas other common constructions involve integer multiplications, our construction involves squaring integers. Since squaring a large integer requires fewer basic word multiplications than multiplying two large integers, we get a speed-up. In certain architectures, multiplication takes signi cantly more time than other basic arithmetic operations, so we can get good savings with this approach. Our second idea is to optimize the implementation of this hash function by ignoring certain parts of the computation; moreover, we formally prove that, despite ignoring these parts of the computation, the bound on the resulting optimized hash function is still low enough to provide for a very secure MAC. One can think of this as \theoretical hacking." Speci cally, the second new idea in this paper is to completely ignore some of the carry bits when performing the computation of the hash function in our basic construction. Since carry bits can be cumbersome to deal with, we can save computational e ort in this manner. We stress that this savings will primarily occur when our tag size is several words long since some architectures allow you to multiply two words, and get a two-word result with all the carries \for free." At rst it seems counterintuitive that we can simply ignore what appears to be a crucial part of the computation. However, we are able to obtain a bound on the resulting value of and we show that our MAC algorithms are still secure for natural choices of the parameters.
Square Hash builds on some of the ideas in the MMH construction of Halevi and Krawczyk 13]; Knudsen independently proposed a similar construction for use in block cipher design 16]. We start with an underlying hash function which is similar to the one used in MMH; however, our new hash function performs fewer multiplications. In MMH, the nal carry bit of the output is ignored { in Square Hash we extend this idea by showing that we can ignore almost all of the carry bits and can still get quite a reasonable trade-o in security.
Hence, in theory, Square Hash should be a strong alternative to MMH. We have implementation results on an ARM processor to substantiate this claim. Moreover, since word blocks in the input can be worked on independently, our constructions are parallelizable. We also show how to e ciently convert anyuniversal hash function into a strongly universal hash function. Thus Square Hash has other applications besides those related to message authentication. We now describe some basic constructions of universal hash function families based on squaring. We also examine modi cations that enable faster implementations at negligible costs in collision probability. In the de nitions and theorems that follow, we work over the integers modulo p where p is a prime. 
Theorem 2. The family SQHU is a strongly universal family of hash functions.
Proof. Follows as a corollary of the previous lemma. Stinson 29] . Speci cally, we hash the message l times using l independently chosen keys and we concatenate the hashes. This yields a collision probability of 1=p l . At rst this requires a much larger key size, but that can be reduced by applying a Toeplitz matrix type idea due to Krawczyk 17] ; namely (for the case l = 2), choose k + 1 scalars x 1 ; : : : ; x k+1 and set the rst key to be hx 1 ; : : : ; x k i and the second key to be hx 2 ; : : : ; x k+1 i. The collision probability reduces to 1=p 
So, all we are doing is ignoring the most signi cant bit of x i + m i . This means that the sum will t into l bits, which means that we do not have to use an extra word to both store and square. 
Ignoring Carry Bits in the Computation
We now describe a way to further speed up Square Hash at a small tradeo in the collision probability. The idea is novel, and can be applied not only to MMH but perhaps to other constructions of universal hash functions. Basically, we show that we can ignore many of the carry bits in the computation of Square Hash and still get very strong performance for cryptographic applications. In some sense this extends the ideas of Halevi and Krawczyk who sped up MMH by ignoring only the most signi cant carry bit. We start by describing the notion of carry bits and explain why computation can speed up if you ignore them. We then de ne variants of Square Hash in which you can ignore some of the carry bits, and show that the resulting performance is still excellent for cryptographic applications. Finally, we de ne yet another variant of Square Hash in which you can ignore even more carry bits and show that the performance is still strong for cryptographic applications under suitable settings for the parameters.
Carry Bits When two words are added, there is usually an over ow or carry that takes place in the computation. For example, if the word size is 8, and you compute 11001001 + 10010001 you get 101011010. Since the word size is 8, the most signi cant bit 1 is called the carry or over ow bit because it over owed from the usual 8 bit word size. Now, when arithmetic operations are performed on very long integers, as is usually the case for cryptographic applications, the carry bits between individual word operations are used for the next operation. So, if the word size is 8, and you are trying to compute 1011010100110101 + 1010101111100101 then the computation is broken up into parts. First, each bit string is broken up to take word size into account. The rst string is broken up into two parts which we label A and B respectively: A = 10110101 and B = 00110101. The second string would be broken up into two parts: C = 10101011 and D = 11100101. Now, the computation is carried out as follows: rst we compute B + D store the answer in a word, and store the carry c 0 separately. Denote by E the word in which we store B + D. Then E = 00011010 and the carry bit c 0 = 1. Now, we compute F = A + C + c 0 and store the carry bit in c 1 . Then F = 01100001 and the carry bit c 1 is 1. The total answer is the concatenation c 1 FE: 10110000100011010. So, it is necessary to keep track of a carry bit as you do the computations on integers that require more than one word to represent. Unfortunately, certain instructions on processors do not deal with carry bits e ectively (for example the Multiply with Accumulate instruction on the ARM). Also, even if an instruction saves the carry bit, this information may get destroyed when other instructions are executed. In addition, most high level programming languages do not deal with carry bits e ectively; this increases the computation time of arithmetic instructions over integers that are several words long because it becomes necessary to explicitly keep track of the carry bit. High level programming languages are, however, preferable because they are portable and they facilitate the task of programming. We show that we can overcome these dilemmas by ignoring the carry bits altogether. We call these variants of Square Hash SQH c and SQH c2 since they can be e ectively implemented with high level programming languages such as C. We can prove that we get strong performance despite ignoring what seems to be a crucial part of the computation.
Ignoring Carry Bits in the Outer Summation We describe a preliminary speedup in which we ignore the carry bits in the outer summation, and show that we still get a powerful approximation to a -universal hash. Let =2 lw is actually rather small. We see this if we substitute suitable values for the parameters. If the word size l is 32 bits, then a computationally unbounded adversary can forge a MAC tag of size 2,3,4, or 5 words with probability at most 2 ?57 , 2 ?86 , 2 ?115 , and 2 ?144 respectively. These are negligible and are smaller that what one may need for a reasonably secure MAC. This leads to the question of whether we can optimize further at a slightly greater cost in security. The next section works towards this aim by showing that we can ignore even more carry bits at an increased cost in collision probability.
Ignoring Carry Bits When Squaring Since the process of squaring can be expressed entirely in terms of doing basic word multiplications, shifts, and add operations, we can consider the idea of ignoring the carry bits when performing a squaring operation to further speed up our hash functions. We show that if we also ignore the carry bits that occur when the quantity (x i + m i ) is squared, then the resulting function still yields a close approximation to a -universal hash for suitable values for the parameters. So let us denote by C 2 (a De nition 13. Let l and k be positive integers, with 2 l < p < 2 l + 2 l?1 . Let x = hx 1 ; : : : ; x k i, and m = hm 1 ; : : : ; m k i, x i ; m i 2 f0; 1g l . The SQH c2 family of functions from (f0; 1g l ) k to Z p is de ned as follows: SQH c2 fg x : (f0; 1g l ) k ?! Z p j x 2 (f0; 1g l ) k g where the functions g x are de ned as
2 )) mod p): (18) Note that we ignore carry bits when we square and when we take the sum over the (x i + m i ) 2 . However, we do not ignore the carry bits when we actually compute (x i + m i ). It is possible that we may be able to get away with ignoring these carry bits as well. We now state our main theorem about how well this new family of hash functions performs: Theorem 9. Let l be the word size of the architecture on which you are computing and let w be the number of words it takes to store x i . Then SQH c2 is an u t
We would like to note that the above theorem represents the worst case scenario since you ignore every possible carry bit when adding and squaring. You can use our techniques, however, to ignore a subset of the carry bits, as opposed to all of them, and get correspondingly better performance. The choice of carry bits you ignore can then depend heavily on implementation criteria such as whether or not particular instructions deal well with carry bits.
Comparison to NMH
At the end of their paper, Halevi 
Comparison to UMAC
Recently, another universal hash function based MAC entitled UMAC was proposed 5]. This construction gives extremely high speeds on the current Pentium processors. In fact, the design makes heavy use of the available MMX instructions. Thus for message authentication applications on modern microprocessors, it is a preferable alternative to Square Hash. On the other hand, for applications such as block cipher design ( 20] , 24], 23]), UMAC may not be the best choice since it needs a tag length of 2w in order to obtain security 2 ?w . Square Hash only needs a tag length of w to achieve security more or less equal to 2 ?w .
Since UMAC was optimized for certain kinds of processors, We are unclear at this point how the Square Hash will compare with UMAC on other processors { though UMAC is extremely fast, and will probably be di cult to beat.
Considerations on Implementing Square Hash
In this section, we discuss various important implementation considerations, and in the next we give actual implementation results. To start with, Square Hash should be faster since we use squaring instead of multiplication. The speed-up factor for squaring an n word integer versus multiplying two n word integers is (n ? 1)=2n. Typically, MACs have tag sizes between 32 and 160 bits, depending on the level of security needed. Therefore, on 32-bit architectures, 1 n 5 and we get speed up factors of %0, %25, %33, %38, and %40 for the di erent values of n. Now, on most slower architectures, multiplications require many more clock cycles than other simple arithmetic operations such as addition. For example, on the original Pentium processor, the ratio between number of clock cycles for unsigned multiplication versus addition is about 5:1. This ratio probably gets much larger on weaker processors such as those on cellular phones, embedded devices, smart-cards, etc,. Moreover, for these types of smaller processors, word sizes may be smaller, hence the number of words we multiply increases, and the savings we achieve by using squaring rather than multiplication greatly increases. Thus, we recommend using Square Hash on such architectures. On some of the more modern processors such as the Pentium Pro and Pentium II, multiplications do not take much more time than additions (closer to 2:1, 9]), so Square Hash is not advantageous is such cases.
Another important implementation consideration is the memory architecture of the processor on which you are implementing. In our case, we need extra data registers to quickly implement squaring. On Pentium architectures there are only 4 32-bit data registers 9]. Hence, we may need to make additional memory references which could slow things down. On the other hand, the PowerPC has 32 32-bit general purpose registers 1], which allows us to get fast squaring.
Finally, one must be careful when using a sceheme based on our techniques if the communicating processors have di erent word sizes. For example, if one of the processors has a 16-bit word size, and other has a 32-bit word size, then ignoring all the carry bits between the words would result in a given message having di erent tags across the two processors. In this case, one must choose a convenient subset of the carry bits to ignore.
Implementation Results
We used the ARM (i.e. ARM7) processor to create hand optimized assembly code to compare speeds of various algorithms. The ARM7 is a popular RISC processor and is used inside cellular phones, PDAs, smartcards, etc. It is a 32 bit processor with 16 general purpose registers. Basic operations like addition require 1 cycle whereas multiplication usually requires 6 cycles.
Our results show a signi cant speedup for square hash over MMH, and thus validate our theoretical results. For long messages and same or better security than MMH, square hash is 1.31 times faster than MMH (Table 1 Message authentication using universal hash functions is performed by breaking up a long message (e.g 1Mbyte) in to smaller blocks (e.g. 2112 bits) and reducing each block, using an equivalent size hash key, down to the size of the MAC output or tag size (e.g. 96 bits). This is repeated via a tree hash until the nal tag is output. Tree hash adds about 10% overhead to both square hash and MMH 13] and we omit it in the calculations presented in the tables for purposes of simplifying comparison. The security parameter as reported in the tables would have to be multiplied by the height of the tree 13].
We report results for a tag size of 96 bits since we believe it is a popular choice for message authentication in Internet standards (e.g. HMAC). Larger output sizes of 128 and 160 bits could further improve speedup factors due to greater savings on multiplications. We also report cycle counts for SHA1 on an ARM7 to verify that we are faster than traditional non-universal hash based MACs (e.g. HMAC). To create the MAC, in actual use, MMH and square hash would have to encrypt the 96 bit output and HMAC-SHA1 would need to perform a further SHA1. We exclude this in the cycle counts in the tables to simplify comparison.
First for 2112-bit blocks (a multiple of 96) we compare MMH, SQH1, SQH2, and HMAC-SHA1. SQH1 is the basic square hash function SQH asm with the minor optimization of SQH asm2 giving an overall security of SHA1 requires more than 1000 operations on 512-bit input and thus requires more than 4000 operations on 2112 bit input. All 3 universal hashes are signicantly faster than the SHA1 based MAC. SQH1 is 1.24 times as fast as MMH and SQH2 is 1.31 times as fast as MMH. Code sizes are somewhat large because of loop unrolling. Without unrolling additional computational time will be added to all three universal hashes to handle looping. The hash key (random bits) for MMH is 96 bits larger than square hash if the Toeplitz construction is In Table 2 we also report cycle counts for 1056-bit blocks. Since 1024 bit blocks, as used by 13], are not a multiple of 96, we used 1056 (a multiple of 32 and 96) as the input length. We ran experiments with messages that had the same size as the tag, and we noticed similar speedups. We also tested C versions of MMH and square hash and we saw similar speedups. Table 3 gives break downs of the instruction and cycle counts for both MMH and SQH2: We are currently working on implementation results for the PowerPC. Our preliminary analysis seems to indicate the same kinds of speed improvements over MMH. The analysis is still, however, preliminary. In the future we hope to experiment with other processors. Table 3 . MMH and SQH2 cycle count break downs: 96 bit output and block size of 2112 bits.
Conclusion
We described a new family of universal hash functions geared towards high speed message authentication. On some platforms, our hash functions appear to be faster than the MMH family, which itself is considered to be one of the fastest universal hash function implementations. We also introduced additional techniques for speeding up our constructions. These constructions and techniques are general and may be of independent interest.
